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The Tensions Between Regulation of the 
Legal Profession and Protection of the First 
Amendment Rights of Lawyers and Judges: 
A Tribute to Ronald Rotunda 
Rodney A. Smolla 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article is dedicated to the memory of my departed 
friend and colleague Ron Rotunda. When I later transition to 
substantive legal analysis, I will use the respectfully professional 
appellation “Professor Rotunda.” In this personal opening 
reflection, however, he will just be Ron. 
Early on in my career as a law professor, I was on the faculty 
with Ron at the University of Illinois College of Law. Ron and his 
close friend and life-long co-author, John Nowak, were my friends 
and my mentors. Ron was a Renaissance Man, with wide-ranging 
intellectual and cultural interests. I will never forget dinners at 
his home, where I learned as much about fine wine and food, 
international travel, and outer-space as I did about legal ethics 
and constitutional law. I have seared in my mind’s eye viewing 
planets through the high-powered telescope Ron had mounted in 
his backyard, unveiling his passion as a dedicated astronomer. 
Ron taught me to see the stars and to reach for them. 
In this Article, I reflect on the intersection of Ron’s two 
greatest scholarly passions: legal ethics and constitutional law. 
More specifically, I focus on the tensions that Ron explored 
between the regulation of the legal profession and the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In 1995, Ron wrote an 
article entitled Racist Speech and Lawyer Discipline.1 In the 
article, Ron argued against the adoption of a proposal to change 
Rule 8.4 of the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility. The proposed change would “make a 
lawyer subject to discipline for engaging in speech that indicates 
racial, or sexual, or other bias.”2 Ron argued passionately that 
the proposed change would be an affront to the free speech values 
 
  Dean and Professor of Law, Widener University Delaware Law School. 
 1 Ronald D. Rotunda, Racist Speech and Lawyer Discipline, 6 PROF. LAW. 1, 1 (1995). 
 2 Id.  
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of the First Amendment.3 
Twenty-one years later, in August of 2016, the ABA adopted 
a new section 8.4(g) to the Model Rules, which provides that it is 
professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that 
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the 
practice of law.”4 
In the summer of 2018, the United States Supreme Court 
decided National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra 
(NIFLA).5 In NIFLA, the Court struck down provisions of a 
California law requiring that pro-life pregnancy centers counsel 
clients on the availability of abortion services.6 On the surface, the 
Supreme Court’s NIFLA pregnancy counseling decision and ABA 
Model Rule 8.4(g) might seem unrelated, but they are linked. 
California attempted to defend its abortion counseling law as a valid 
regulation of “professional speech.”7 To the extent that ABA Model 
Rule 8.4(g) applies to the speech of lawyers, its proponents might 
proffer the same defense. Rule 8.4(g), it may be claimed, regulates 
only professional conduct. To the extent that the regulation of the 
professional conduct of lawyers incidentally implicates a lawyer’s 
speech, the argument continues that regulation of “professional 
speech” should have little, if any, First Amendment protection.  
My friend Ron—Professor Rotunda—would never have 
countenanced this argument. In this personal tribute to Ron, I 
offer my thoughts on why I think the great Professor Rotunda was 
right. By the same token, Rule 8.4(g), as it was finally passed, was 
by no means a brazen effort to restrict politically incorrect speech. 
On its face, it targets only conduct, and even then, only conduct 
that would constitute “harassment” or “discrimination” to boot.8 
Professor Rotunda’s early attacks at more sweeping proposals may 
actually have accomplished their purpose by narrowing the 
compass of what the ABA finally enacted. In this Article, I explore 
these conundrums in honor of my friend and colleague’s memory, 
and his towering contributions to the legal profession and the 
ongoing interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 3 Id. 
 4 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 5 See generally 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 6 Id. at 2370. 
 7 Id. at 2371. 
 8 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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II. ABA MODEL RULE 8.4(G) 
The text of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), as passed by the ABA 
House of Delegates in August of 2016, was the product of an 
evolutionary process that began in the mid-1990s when Professor 
Rotunda first voiced his opposition. The original proposals were 
advances on what was once Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4(d). 
That former Comment 3 read:  
A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests 
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, 
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, 
violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing 
factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge’s finding that 
peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not 
alone establish a violation of this rule.9  
This Comment plainly encompassed expression, as it openly 
referred to “words or conduct.”10 It was tempered, however, by the 
requirement that the actions be “prejudicial to the administration 
of justice.”11 
The provision that would become Rule 8.4(g), when adopted 
at the 2016 annual meeting in San Francisco, began to gain 
traction in 2014 through what was known as “Resolution 109.”12 
The resolution went through numerous revisions and iterations 
before the version ultimately enacted was passed. That version 
provides in its entirety that it is misconduct for a lawyer to: 
engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is 
harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, 
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to 
the practice of law. This paragraph does not limit the ability of a 
lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in 
accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude 
legitimate advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.13 
The intended scope of Rule 8.4(g) is slightly amplified by 
Comment 4, which provides some additional definition to the 
phrase “conduct related to the practice of law,” by reciting: 
Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing clients; 
interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and 
 
 9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Annual Meeting 2016: ABA amends Model Rules to add anti-discrimination, 
anti-harassment provision, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/news/ 
abanews/aba-news-archives/2016/08/annual_meeting_20161/ [http://perma.cc/YMU3-YYYT]. 
 13 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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others while engaged in the practice of law; operating or managing a 
law firm or law practice; and participating in bar association, business 
or social activities in connection with the practice of law. Lawyers may 
engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion 
without violating this Rule by, for example, implementing initiatives 
aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees 
or sponsoring diverse law student organizations.14 
Taken in combination, the text of Rule 8.4(g) and the 
accompanying Comment 4 present some ambiguity as to whether 
the Rule regulates the speech of lawyers. Rule 8.4(g) is phrased as 
only engaging in “conduct” that is “related to the practice of law” 
which would constitute “harassment or discrimination.”15 The text 
of the Rule assiduously avoids reference to speech. Unlike old 
Comment 3, it avoids use of the phrase “manifests by words.”  
Yet, the practice of law is almost entirely accomplished 
through the use of language. Doctors operate on the human body 
probing the organs, performing surgeries, and prescribing 
medications. Doctors also use speech to counsel and communicate 
to patients. The practice of medicine, however, is at least in equal 
parts physical and expressive. The practice of law, however, is 
almost entirely expressive. To regulate the “conduct” of lawyers is 
almost entirely to regulate what lawyers say. There are, of course, 
non-expressive aspects to the regulation of professional conduct. 
Rules relating to conflicts of interest, for example, concern 
transactions and relationships more than speech—though even 
those rules often implicate expression, as when they implicate 
obligations of disclosure or confidentiality.16  
Even so, a large part of law practice is expressive, and a 
large part of the rules governing professional responsibility 
inevitably involve expression. Thus, “conduct” related to the 
practice of law that would amount to harassment or 
discrimination still could easily encompass expressive activity 
arguably falling within the protective ambit of the First 
Amendment. Comment 4 plainly suggests that this is so by 
describing the “conduct” prohibited as extending to “participating 
in bar association, business or social activities in connection with 
the practice of law.”17 Rule 8.4(g)’s potential tensions with the First 
Amendment are further intensified by the curious final sentence to 
Comment 4, which has troubling colorations of viewpoint 
discrimination. Lawyers are expressly allowed to “promote diversity 
and inclusion” by, for example, “implementing initiatives aimed at 
 
 14 Id. at cmt. 4. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992). 
 17 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or 
sponsoring diverse law student organizations.”18 This safe-harbor 
for what lawyers can do plainly envisions expressive activity that 
promotes progressive pro-diversity provisions, suggesting that what 
lawyers cannot do is engage in similarly expressive activity 
promoting an anti-inclusive or anti-diversity end.  
III. PROFESSOR ROTUNDA’S CRITIQUE 
Professor Rotunda’s attack on the insipient emerging proposals 
to modify Rule 8.4 that surfaced in the 1990s assumed that the 
proposals were intended to curb the expression of lawyers as 
lawyers in a manner that would not be permitted under the First 
Amendment for non-lawyers. This led Professor Rotunda to frame 
his analysis by asking what additional purchase on the regulation 
of speech was gained by governmental authorities engaged in the 
conduct of regulating the legal profession.19 From this starting 
point, he divined a critical divide separating those rules of 
professional responsibility that are functionally related to the 
practice of law and those that are not: 
The anti-speech proposals before the ABA are bad policy for another 
reason. For many years the ABA has fought to limit discipline of 
lawyers to matters that are functionally related to the practice of law. 
There are a lot of things that are bad (or that large segments of our 
population think are bad) but that do not preclude one from practicing 
law. Rule 8.4(b) does not provide that it is professional misconduct to 
engage in any “criminal act”; rather, it is only misconduct to engage in 
a criminal act “that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” 
In the old days, many states were disciplining lawyers for adultery or 
fornication. While most people do not approve of adultery, that does not 
mean that one should discipline a lawyer for engaging in it. The official 
Comment to Rule 8.4 states that offenses “of personal morality, such as 
adultery and comparable offenses” do not relate to the fitness to practice 
law. “Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal 
law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that 
indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice.”20 
In a manner characteristic of his qualities as a Renaissance 
Man, Professor Rotunda concluded his attack on the nascent 
version of Rule 8.4(g) by invoking classical conceptions of freedom 
of speech.21 Professor Rotunda observed that “[i]n ancient Athens, 
the cradle of democracy, the Greeks widely believed that their 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Rotunda, supra note 1. 
 20 Id. at 4 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). 
 21 Id. at 6. 
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freedom of speech made their armies more brave.”22 Professor 
Rotunda invoked the history of Herodotus, who boasted that the 
Athenians could win victories over the more numerous Persians 
because the Athenians fought not as slaves but as free people 
respecting free speech.23 So too, in his play The Persian, Aeschylus 
touted the victory of the Greeks because: “Of no man are they the 
slaves or subjects.”24 Quoting I.F. Stone, Professor Rotunda 
concluded: “For Aeschylus, and for the Athenians, it was not just a 
victory of Greeks over Persians but of free men over ‘slaves.’ The 
victors at Salamis were men elevated and inspired by the freedom 
to speak their minds and govern themselves.”25 Admonishing the 
ABA to not forget these ancient truths, Professor Rotunda urged 
the ABA to resist, even in a spirit of compromise, lending “any 
support to those who would discipline lawyers (or anyone else) for 
what they say or think, even when we know that what they say or 
think is abhorrent and offensive.”26 
IV. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROFESSIONAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The “professional speech doctrine” developed momentum 
through a series of decisions by various federal circuits from 2013 
through 2016. The courts posited that the regulation of the 
speech of professionals, incident to the regulation of a profession 
should be analyzed under some level of reduced First 
Amendment scrutiny.27 In Pickup v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit 
invoked the professional speech doctrine to uphold a California 
law forbidding such sexual orientation change efforts for minors, 
applying simple rational basis review.28 The same year, the Third 
Circuit invoked the professional speech doctrine to uphold a 
similar law in King v. Governor of New Jersey.29 Moreover, the 
Fourth Circuit invoked the professional speech doctrine to 
sustain regulation of the speech of fortune tellers in Moore-King 
v. County of Chesterfield.30 
The incipient professional speech doctrine drew significant 
commentary and mixed reviews.31 I was an opponent of the 
 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id. (quoting 2 AESCHYLUS, PLAYS (H. Weir Smyth, trans., 1922)). 
 25 Id. (quoting I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES 51 (1988)). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See generally  David L. Hudson Jr., The Professional Speech Doctrine , FIRST 
AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1551/professional-
speech-doctrine [http://perma.cc/z82E-LNGR]. 
 28 See 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 29 See 767 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 30 708 F.3d 560, 569–70 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 31 See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and 
Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681 (2016); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 
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recognition of the professional speech doctrine. My critique of the 
doctrine sounded themes parallel to those invoked by Professor 
Rotunda in his early admonitions against the initial proposals to 
enact changes to Rule 8.4. Modern First Amendment doctrine is 
rooted in faith in the marketplace.32 Overreaching by 
government, not overreaching by lawyers, doctors, or fortune 
tellers, is the primary concern of the First Amendment.33 Instead 
of inventing a special level of reduced scrutiny for the regulation 
of speech by professionals, I argued courts should engage in the 
rigorous strict scrutiny test in analyzing content-based 
regulation of professional speech.34 Application of strict scrutiny 
will sort the chaff from the wheat, resulting in the striking down 
of paternalistic regulations that deserve to be struck down, and 
the upholding of regulations that deserve to be upheld. 
Somewhat to my surprise, the Supreme Court of the United 
States effectively killed the professional speech doctrine earlier 
and more emphatically than I ever might have imagined. The 
professional speech doctrine crashed and burned in NIFLA.35 
NIFLA posed a challenge to the California Reproductive Freedom, 
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (the 
“FACT Act”).36 The California law was enacted to regulate crisis 
pregnancy centers—pro-life centers that offer pregnancy-related 
services.37 The FACT Act required licensed clinics that primarily 
serve pregnant women to advise those women that California 
provides free or low-cost services, including abortions, and give 
them a phone number to call.38 The FACT Act’s stated purpose 
was to make sure that state residents know their rights and what 
healthcare services are available to them.39 Unlicensed clinics 
must notify women that California had not licensed the clinics to 
provide medical services, to ensure that pregnant women know 
when they are receiving healthcare from licensed professionals.40  
In striking down the California provisions, the Court 
observed that the “Court has not recognized ‘professional speech’ 
 
YALE L.J. 1238, 1241 (2016); Jacob M. Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation Change 
Efforts: The California Approach, Its Limitations, and Potential Alternatives, 123 YALE L.J. 
1532, 1537 (2014). 
 32 Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. 
REV. 67, 112 (2016). 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See generally 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 36 Id. at 2368; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123470 (West 2018). 
 37 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2368. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 2369.  
 40 Id. at 2370.  
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as a separate category of speech.”41 The Court distinguished two 
areas of existing First Amendment law in which it had previously 
recognized that standards lower than strict scrutiny applied to 
the speech of professionals was appropriate.42 
The intermediate scrutiny “commercial speech” standard 
applied to the commercial speech of professionals, such as 
advertising.43 The commercial speech standard was limited, 
however, to requiring disclosure, at times, of factual 
noncontroversial information: “First, our precedents have applied 
more deferential review to some laws that require professionals to 
disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial 
speech.’”44 But rules governing disclosure in commercial speech 
contexts, under the leading lawyer advertising commercial speech 
decision involving disclosures, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,45 the Court held, were not 
applicable to the sort of disclosures California sought to impose on 
the clinics under the guise of the professional speech doctrine.46 The 
speech California sought to force the clinics to speak had nothing to 
do with the clinics’ services or products, but were entirely the 
state-sponsored message of California.47 
The Court in NIFLA also rejected the argument that the 
California provisions could be upheld as regulation of 
professional conduct that “incidentally involves speech,” of the 
sort approved in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.48 Professional 
ethical standards, or suits for professional malpractice, for 
example, have traditionally been regarded as regulating professional 
conduct, though that conduct may involve speaking.49 “While 
drawing the line between speech and conduct can be difficult, this 
Court’s precedents have long drawn it.”50 
“Outside of the two contexts discussed above—disclosures 
 
 41 Id. at 2371. 
 42 Id. at 2372. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. (first citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of  
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); then citing Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States, 559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010); and then citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 
U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).  
 45 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
 46 NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2372. 
 47 See id. (“The Zauderer standard does not apply here. Most obviously, the licensed 
notice is not limited to ‘purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under 
which . . . services will be available.’ The notice in no way relates to the services that licensed 
clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored 
services—including abortion, anything but an ‘uncontroversial’ topic. Accordingly, Zauderer 
has no application here.” (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See id. at 2373.  
 50 Id. 
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under Zauderer and professional conduct—this Court’s precedents 
have long protected the First Amendment rights of professionals,” 
the Court observed.51 For example, the Court “has applied strict 
scrutiny to content-based laws that regulate the noncommercial 
speech of lawyers, professional fundraisers, and organizations that 
provided specialized advice about international law.”52 
The Court had sound reasons for driving a stake through the 
heart of the professional speech doctrine. “The dangers associated with 
content-based regulations of speech are also present in the context of 
professional speech.”53 As with other kinds of speech, the Court 
reasoned, regulating the content of professionals’ speech poses the 
inherent risk that the government seeks not to advance a legitimate 
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information.54 
Indeed, throughout history, governments have manipulated the speech 
of professionals “to increase state power and suppress minorities.”55 
This skews the operation of the marketplace of ideas: 
Professionals might have a host of good-faith disagreements, both 
with each other and with the government, on many topics in their 
respective fields. Doctors and nurses might disagree about the ethics 
of assisted suicide or the benefits of medical marijuana; lawyers and 
marriage counselors might disagree about the prudence of prenuptial 
agreements or the wisdom of divorce; bankers and accountants might 
disagree about the amount of money that should be devoted to savings 
or the benefits of tax reform.56 
The Court noted that, among other things, the reach of the 
professional speech doctrine was almost limitless, given the 
difficulty of defining what would or would not qualify as 
 
 51 Id. at 2374. 
 52 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 53 Id.  
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. For example:  
[D]uring the Cultural Revolution, Chinese physicians were dispatched to the 
countryside to convince peasants to use contraception. In the 1930s, the Soviet 
government expedited completion of a construction project on the Siberian 
railroad by ordering doctors to both reject requests for medical leave from work 
and conceal this government order from their patients. In Nazi Germany, the 
Third Reich systematically violated the separation between state ideology and 
medical discourse. German physicians were taught that they owed a higher 
duty to the “health of the Volk” than to the health of individual patients. 
Recently, Nicolae Ceausescu’s strategy to increase the Romanian birth rate 
included prohibitions against giving advice to patients about the use of birth 
control devices and disseminating information about the use of condoms as a 
means of preventing the transmission of AIDS. 
Id. (quoting Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse 
and the Right To Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 201–02 (1994) 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 56 Id. at 2374–75. 
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“professional.”57 Indeed, the professional speech doctrine had the 
capacity to turn fundamental First Amendment assumptions 
upside down. For carried to its logical end, all the government 
would be required to do is create licensure rules for any 
particular occupation and then seek to reduce the freedom of 
members of that occupation to speak by treating the regulation 
as mere regulation of professional speech.58 States do not get to 
choose the level of scrutiny a regulation will receive under the 
First Amendment; it is the First Amendment that chooses the 
level of scrutiny applied to a regulation by the States.59 
The Court in NIFLA did not foreclose the slim possibility 
that in some future scenario there might be a case for reduced 
scrutiny of the regulation of professionals: 
In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a 
persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category 
that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. We do not 
foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists. We need not do so 
because the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny. 
California asserts a single interest to justify the licensed notice: providing 
low-income women with information about state-sponsored services. 
Assuming that this is a substantial state interest, the licensed notice is 
not sufficiently drawn to achieve it.60 
This modest hedge, however, was nothing more, in my view, than 
recognition that there undoubtedly are situations, as Professor 
Rotunda’s article acknowledged,61 when palpable government 
interests related to the functional health of the administration of 
justice and the conduct of lawyers will not run afoul of the First 
Amendment. In the closing section of this Article, I elaborate on 
what I believe Professor Rotunda had in mind, and what the 
Supreme Court in NIFLA had in mind, and how those minds are 
well-met, forming a coherent theory of what sorts of regulation of 
the speech of lawyers the Constitution does and does not permit.  
 
 57 Id. (citing Smolla, supra note 32).  
 58 Id. at 2375 (“All that is required to make something a ‘profession,’ according to 
these courts, is that it involves personalized services and requires a professional license 
from the State. But that gives the States unfettered power to reduce a group ’s First 
Amendment rights by simply imposing a licensing requirement.”). 
 59 Id. (“States cannot choose the protection that speech receives under the First 
Amendment, as that would give them a powerful tool to impose ‘invidious discrimination 
of disfavored subjects.’” (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 
423–24, n.19 (1993))); see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 
796 (1988) (“[S]tate labels cannot be dispositive of [the] degree of First Amendment 
protection.” (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975))). 
 60 138 S. Ct. at 2375. 
 61 See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 1, at 6. 
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V. EXPLORING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
If the power of government to regulate the speech of lawyers 
and judges is considered on a spectrum, the government’s power 
will surely be at its apex when the regulation is directly connected 
to the management of the administration of justice. Speech by 
lawyers and judges inside a courtroom is the quintessential 
example. In Sacher v. United States, the Supreme Court sustained 
the power of courts to use their contempt authority to sanction a 
lawyer for his expression within a courtroom.62 The Court invoked 
solid, functional rationales for its ruling, noting that “[t]he nature 
of the [lawyer’s] deportment was not such as merely to offend 
personal sensitivities of the judge, but it prejudiced the 
expeditious, orderly and dispassionate conduct of the trial.”63 
When a lawyer speaks outside a courtroom on a matter 
pending inside a courtroom, the constitutional protection for the 
speech remains high, though the government is permitted, 
under the rule of Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,64 to limit the 
extrajudicial speech of a lawyer participating in an ongoing 
proceeding when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know 
that the speech will “hav[e] a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing that [adjudicative] proceeding.”65 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are efforts by the 
government to use the leverage of licensing attorneys to exact 
requirements that attorneys not take disfavored positions on 
public issues not directly germane to the practice law. The First 
Amendment would surely be violated by a sweeping regulation 
prohibiting an attorney from engaging in racist speech, or joining 
a racist organization, in situations in which the speech or the 
membership bear no connection to the practice of law. 
As reprehensible as racist speech and membership in 
racist organizations were to Professor Rotunda—and are to 
 
 62 343 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1952). 
 63 Id. at 5. 
 64 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 65 Id. at 1076. (“The regulation of attorneys’ speech is limited—it applies only to 
speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to 
points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; and it 
merely postpones the attorneys’ comments until after the trial.”). While this rule comes 
from the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, on this issue the Chief Justice 
spoke for the Court. Id. at 1032, 1076. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of 
the Court joined by Justices White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter, upholding the general 
“substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard. Id. at 1032, 1063 (“We conclude 
that the ‘substantial likelihood of material prejudice’ standard applied by Nevada and 
most other States satisfies the First Amendment.”). The Court nonetheless struck down 
Nevada’s unusual interpretation and application of the rule, holding it was  
unconstitutionally vague, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, and joined by 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor. Id. at 1048.  
Do Not Delete 5/29/2019 2:34 PM 
296 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:2 
me—Americans, including lawyers, have a right to be racist 
and associate with other racists. Professor Rotunda ’s position 
was crystalline in its clarity: 
First, let me make clear that I do not support lawyers who engage in 
racial or sexual discrimination. Nor do I think that lawyers should tell 
racist, ethnic, sexist, or other similar jokes. We should not laugh at 
such jokes, or otherwise indicate support of such speech. We can 
indicate, by our speech, that we do not approve of such discriminatory 
speech. The best weapon against the speech we do not like is more 
speech, not enforced silence. 
It is one thing for us to disapprove of such speech, and it is another 
matter if we seek to use the authority of the state to punish such 
speech. The latter violates the First Amendment.66 
For my part, I served as lead counsel, writing the briefs and 
presenting argument in the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black,67 
in which my clients included a leader of the Ku Klux Klan, a 
dedicated white supremacist, who had led a cross-burning ceremony 
as part of a traditional Klan ritual.68 I was able to draw a 
distinction between my revulsion for his beliefs and my own belief 
in the First Amendment. 
Where on the spectrum does the new ABA Model Rule 
8.4(g) fall? Consider, as part of the mix, a somewhat parallel 
provision in Rule 2.3(B) of the American Bar Association Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct: 
A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or 
conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment, 
including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based upon 
race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, 
sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political 
affiliation, and shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others 
subject to the judge’s direction and control to do so.69 
Rule 2.3(B) is in some respects ostensibly broader than Rule 
8.4(g). Rule 2.3(B) prohibits “words or conduct,”70 whereas Rule 8.4(g) 
requires that the lawyer “engage in conduct.”71 Rule 2.3(B) reaches 
“words” that “manifest bias or prejudice.”72 Thus, for a judge to 
express himself or herself in words that manifest prejudice is 
prohibited. In contrast, Rule 8.4(g) requires that the conduct 
prohibited “is harassment or discrimination.”73 On the other hand, 
 
 66 Rotunda, supra note 1, at 1. 
 67 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 68 Id. at 347. 
 69 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
 70 See id. 
 71 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 72 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
 73 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
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in one respect, Rule 2.3(B) is arguably more tightly confined than 
Rule 8.4(g). Rule 2.3(B) is limited to what a judge does “in the 
performance of judicial duties.”74 Rule 8.4(g) refers to “conduct 
related to the practice of law,” a concept that might be deemed more 
expansive than actual performance of the practice of law. Comment 
4, as previously noted, suggests the potentially expansive reach of 
the prohibition, describing it as reaching actions by lawyers 
“participating in bar association, business or social activities in 
connection with the practice of law.”75 
A narrow reading of Rule 8.4(g) would limit its reach to 
conduct in the practice of law constituting “harassment” or 
“discrimination” of the sort that would be illegal and unprotected 
by the Constitution, under federal, state, and local civil rights 
laws. If that is all that Rule 8.4(g) prohibits, then the hubbub 
over it is much ado about nothing. But it is not at all plain that 
Rule 8.4(g) is so limited. The scholarly commentary on the issue 
is divided.76 A particularly thoughtful and balanced exploration 
of the issues by Professor Rebecca Aviel canvasses the history, 
text, and commentary of the Rule, yet concludes somewhat 
inconclusively, describing sensibilities about the Rule as a 
cultural work-in-progress. 77 Professor Aviel argues that “Rule 
8.4(g) is a project to reshape the norms of the legal profession so 
that discrimination and harassment come to be seen as similarly 
grievous as misrepresentation and dishonesty.”78 Professor Aviel 
admits this is an ambitious project, but ends with the optimistic 
exhortation that “with a bit more work we can make sure it is not 
an unconstitutional one.”79 
Individual states, of course, must make their own choices as to 
whether to adopt language suggested by ABA Model Rule 
 
 74 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014). 
 75 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 76 See Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A 
Guide for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 216 
(2017) (“The claim that ‘harassment’ is unfairly vague, perhaps fatally so, ignores some 
powerful contrary arguments.”); Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts 
Considering Model Rule 8.4(g) the First Amendment and “Conduct Related to the Practice 
of Law”, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 257 (2017) (“Because no jurisdiction has ever 
attempted to enforce a speech code over social activities merely ‘connected with the 
practice of law,’ there are no precedents to turn to in order to assess such a regime's 
constitutionality. (Professor Gillers fails to acknowledge this gap in his otherwise 
thorough analysis.) While discrimination and sexual harassment do have established 
bodies of case law that can be referred to, longstanding ethics rules do not penalize 
harassment by itself in the context of private speech at various social functions. In such 
fora, the government’s interest is at its nadir, and tailoring must be extremely narrow to 
survive judicial scrutiny.” (footnote omitted)). 
 77 See Rebecca Aviel, Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment: Distinguishing Between 
Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 55 (2018). 
 78 Id. at 76. 
 79 Id.  
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8.4(g), and if so, whether to modify the Rule to bring it more clearly 
into conformity with First Amendment norms. There are numerous 
steps that can be taken to tighten the scope of the Rule, and in so 
tightening, reduce tensions with the First Amendment. 
One step is to include limiting language that would clarify 
that only conduct, including conduct effectuated through the use of 
language, that would constitute harassment or discrimination as 
defined under such civil rights laws as Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 are prohibited by the Rule. The leading Supreme 
Court case defining the contours of hostile work environment 
claims under Title VII should be understood as also establishing 
the permissible limitations on what constitutes “harassment” for 
the purpose of the regulation of the conduct of lawyers. In Harris 
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,80 the Court explained: 
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively 
hostile or abusive work environment — an environment that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive — is beyond Title 
VII’s purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive 
the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered 
the conditions of the victim’s employment, and there is no Title VII 
violation. But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct 
leads to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work 
environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ 
psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ 
job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or 
keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without 
regard to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory 
conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment 
abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or 
national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.81 
The Supreme Court has never taken a deep dive into an 
explanation of exactly why expression that would be protected by 
the First Amendment in the general marketplace might 
nonetheless be proscribable in the workplace. There are, however, 
cogent justifications. 
First, speech that might be dismissed as constitutionally 
protected hate speech in the general marketplace takes on a 
different pallor within the workplace environment. An employee 
who sues under Title VII and recovers is clearly not engaged in an 
attempt to recover for mere distress caused by the content of a 
speaker’s message. The employee, instead, is invoking a legal 
remedy for abridgment of a legally vested interest: The interest 
Title VII grants all employees in freedom from discrimination in the 
 
 80 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 81 Id. at 21–22. 
Do Not Delete 5/29/2019 2:34 PM 
2019] A Tribute to Ronald Rotunda 299 
workplace. More than mere offense in reaction to the message is in 
play. There is a more palpable disruption of a legal relationship 
protected by law: The relationship of an employee to an employer 
that is guaranteed to be free from prohibited discrimination. 
Second, there are captive audience and coercion elements 
implicated in the workplace. The classic response to exposure to 
offensive speech in the general marketplace is that the offended 
viewer should look the other way.82 “The plain, if at times 
disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic society, constantly 
proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression, ‘we are 
inescapably captive audiences for many purposes.’”83 Now more 
than ever, we are constantly bombarded with speech that we deem 
false, coarse, and offensive. Would that it was not so, but this is 
the world we live in. “Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, 
if not our political and moral, sensibilities.”84 It comes down 
largely to an issue of who “decide[s].”85 Modern First Amendment 
orthodoxy, which Professor Rotunda deeply embraced, is that the 
“who” ought not be the government. In this deep belief, I believe 
he was right. He was surely right in the estimation of the Supreme 
Court, because the Court proclaimed, “the Constitution does not 
permit [the] government to decide which types of otherwise 
protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for 
the unwilling listener or viewer.”86 Yes, we are all subjected, all of 
the time, to messages that offend us. But the constitutional 
presumption is that, as adults, we avoid what bothers us by 
looking away, or dealing with it and responding.87 
A second step is to abandon efforts to regulate the conduct of 
lawyers with regard to biased speech in bar association, business, 
or social activities related to the practice of law. In these settings, 
there is great danger that bar authorities, wielding the force of 
the state, would be invited to investigate and potentially punish 
boorish, unsavory, and offensive comments that would turn off 
many, if not most, lawyers of goodwill and restrained judgment 
said in intemperate moments at a conference or a cocktail party. 
Our profession has plenty of informal social, cultural, and 
peer-pressure levers to exert as a counter to such expression. To 
render such expression grounds for professional discipline, 
however, comes dangerously close to imposing a culture of 
 
 82 Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975). 
 83 Id. at 210 (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)).  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 210–11 (“Rather, . . . the burden normally falls upon the viewer to ‘avoid 
further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.’” (quoting Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
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orthodoxy and decorum that may align with the highest 
aspirations of the profession, but cannot be squared with the 
values of free speech in an open society. As I have argued 
elsewhere, much of modern First Amendment law is most easily 
understood as an exercise in boundary disputes. In the general 
marketplace, we extend robust protection to even the most 
offensive opinions. Unless the speech meets the rigorous First 
Amendment standards defining incitement to violence, a true 
threat, or defamation, to use common examples, the Constitution 
protects it. In certain “carve outs” from the general marketplace, 
such as the workplace, speech that would be protected in the 
general marketplace may become proscribable. The standard in 
Harris defining hostile work environments, for example, would 
render actionable under Title VII language that which could not 
be penalized off-duty in a public park.88 The looseness of current 
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), particularly as expanded by Comment 4, 
seems to disregard this fundamental constitutional divide. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
My friend Ron Rotunda was a scholar, teacher, and advocate 
driven by deep conviction and powerful passions. Perhaps that is 
why he was so solicitous of freedom of speech, and so cautious about 
equating attitudes and sentiments he deemed unsavory as 
punishable violations of legally binding ethical rules. I am thankful 
to the Chapman Law Review for the opportunity to offer this brief 
reflection on the personality and principles of Ron Rotunda, whose 
passions and thoughts made this world a better place.  
 
 88 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
